Authors : Giancarlo Pellegrino , Martin Johns , Simon Koch , Michael Backes , Christian Rossow Authors Info & Claims
Pages 1757 - 1771 Published : 30 October 2017 Publication History 38 citation 698 Downloads Total Citations 38 Total Downloads 698 Last 12 Months 63 Last 6 weeks 4 Get Citation AlertsThis alert has been successfully added and will be sent to: You will be notified whenever a record that you have chosen has been cited.
To manage your alert preferences, click on the button below. Manage my AlertsCross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities are a severe class of web vulnerabilities that have received only marginal attention from the research and security testing communities. While much effort has been spent on countermeasures and detection of XSS and SQLi, to date, the detection of CSRF vulnerabilities is still performed predominantly manually.
In this paper, we present Deemon, to the best of our knowledge the first automated security testing framework to discover CSRF vulnerabilities. Our approach is based on a new modeling paradigm which captures multiple aspects of web applications, including execution traces, data flows, and architecture tiers in a unified, comprehensive property graph. We present the paradigm and show how a concrete model can be built automatically using dynamic traces.Then, using graph traversals, we mine for potentially vulnerable operations. Using the information captured in the model, our approach then automatically creates and conducts security tests, to practically validate the found CSRF issues. We evaluate the effectiveness of Deemon with 10 popular open source web applications. Our experiments uncovered 14 previously unknown CSRF vulnerabilities that can be exploited, for instance, to take over user accounts or entire websites.
